How the Bengals Offense Won the Battle of the Red Zone vs. the 49ers

It took until Week 8, but the Bengals offense finally looked the way everyone thought it would heading into the season. Joe Burrow completed 28 of 32 passes for 283 yards, 3 TDs, and 0 INTs against the 49ers. Cincy also ran for 134 yards, averaging 5 yards per carry. They did pretty much whatever they wanted to for 60 minutes against one of the best defenses in the league.

If you’re looking for an indicator that Joe Burrow is close to 100%, his average time-to-throw numbers provide some insight. Against the 49ers, they were the slowest they’ve been all season, according to Pro Football Focus. Not to mention, Burrow got rid of the ball in 2.5 seconds or less on just 44% of his drop-backs, a season low.

Why are these numbers significant? Because they indicate that Burrow didn’t have to just get rid of the ball immediately in order to compensate for a lack of mobility due to his calf. They mean he felt good enough to scramble if the situation demanded it. They mean he felt comfortable hanging in the pocket and trusting that his feet could help him navigate the pass rush if necessary.

All of this allowed the Bengals’ pass plays the time they needed to develop. The result was that Cincy’s offensive scheme, which is a good one, was able to have a greater impact on the game.

That scheme was particularly outstanding in the red zone, where the Bengals scored 4 touchdowns and were able to win in a number of ways.

Success in the red zone can be difficult for any offense to achieve. The field is condensed so there’s less ground for the defense to account for, which means defenders in coverage can be more aggressive and take chances.

The key for any offense, therefore, is to find ways to take advantage of that aggressiveness and create space. Cincinnati did that all afternoon.

On their first touchdown, they motioned to a 3x1 bunch formation. CB Isaiah Oliver followed the motion man, Tyler Boyd, an indicator of man coverage:

The Bengals had a play called to attack man. The design would target Boyd, now aligned as the #3 receiver. The other two receivers in the bunch would run their routes inside, taking their defenders with them:

Boyd was left alone vs. Oliver with a lot of space to operate to the outside since he was running his route from that inside #3 position.

Oliver would defend Boyd’s route flat-footed and with inside leverage. He appeared ready to break on a choice route to the outside by Boyd (likely based on tendency). And the way Boyd slowly released off the line certainly indicated that he would be running that choice route: